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What is ideology? 
O que é a ideologia?
Qu’est-ce que l’idéologie?
¿Qué es la ideología?
John Levi Martin
 
 Different ways of conceptualizing ideology1 
1 It is common for sociological discussions of ideology to begin by acknowledging, if not
bemoaning, the plurality of different ways of using the term “ideology” (Eagleton 1991).
 Marx  and  Engels  used  it  to denote  the  most  abstract  conceptions  that  populate  an
imaginary world of ideas independent of material life;  later Marxists often used it to
denote  a  conspiratorial  ideational  wool pulled over  the  eyes  of  the  masses;  political
scientists use it to denote packages of positions, often believed to be unifiable in a single
preferred optimal state, and, of course, many of us use it to denote the beliefs, attitudes
and opinions of those with whom we disagree. 
2 A  conventional  solution  in  sociology  to  these  problems  comes  from  our  nominalist
epistemology—that is, we tend to assume that general theoretical terms must be created
by the analyst and are heuristic devices used to greater or lesser success in particular
analyses.  Thus we assume that each investigator is basically free to choose how to define
his or her terms, and the worst that we can say regarding a particular case is that the
definitions didn’t help much.   
3 Now there are some good reasons for accepting such a nominalist position, but it is far
from obviously the best one for the social sciences, and there is much to recommend a
quasi “realist” position instead.  That is,  we assume that the generalities that we talk
about are not open to definition at the whim of the investigator, but are treated as largely
pre-given.  It is worth emphasizing that this sort of realism (as opposed to nominalism) is
separable from the issue of realism as opposed to idealism (for more on this distinction,
see  Martin,  2014).   For  example,  many  sociologists  are  being  realists  in  this (anti-
nominalist)  sense  when  they  argue  that  sociologists  should  focus  on  the  categories
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(“emic”) that are used by actors.  Even though some of these sociologists may be more
like “idealists” in that they argue that all the categories that actors use are (potentially)
disconnected from material reality, the investigator is not free to define categories for his
or her particular analytic purposes, but must be guided by the externally created ones.
 Thus if a certain group has a definition of “witch,” the investigator must attempt to
grasp this, as opposed to defining what counts as a witch for her purposes of investigation.
4 Most field theorists, following Bourdieu (e.g., 1984 [1979]), have such a realist position
regarding the nature of some of the key constructs they use to understand social action
(though some, like Wacquant,  2002,  and Bourdieu himself,  will  criticize certain other
definitions used by the actors they study, specifically, those in which some sort of “bad
faith” is inherent; Wacquant, 1999: 276, has a clear defense of a rationalist interpretation
of Bourdieu—that is, one that privileges a coherent and defensibly true vision of social
conflicts).  In particular, the endogenous definition of the “stakes” of any field, and what
capital can be legitimately (if questionably) used to pursue these, leads the investigator to
need to have her concepts guided by those of actors.  The sociologist who “defines” what
“art” is is not studying the field but playing a role in it. 
5 Thus if politics is one of those spheres of actions that can be called a field, guided by the
reciprocal  orientation of  actors to one another,  we cannot allow ourselves simply to
define things as they suit us best.  It is for this reason that we cannot simply solve all our
problems by agreeing to disagree, and to disagree by defining our terms differently—at
least  when it  comes to aspects of  political  life that are within the phenomenological
experience of subjects.  And I think there is good reason to think that there is a working
consensus as to what we mean by ideology in politics.  That is, actors will tend to agree as
to who (other than themselves, of course), “has” an ideology and when they seem to be
deploying it.  Thus here I want to attempt to understand the nature of this ideology—that
which  actors  seem  to  consensually  develop  and  use  in  ordering  their  political
attachments. 
6 Here I am going to argue that the conceptions that might seem furthest apart—that of
Marx and Engels on the one hand, and those of political scientists on the other—must be
put together.  That is, political ideology is “ideology” in the sense of Marx and Engels not
because it  is  false or distracting,  but because it  is  the ideational equivalent of actual
patterns of relations, in this case, specifically political relations. 
 
 Political ideology and political reasoning 
The Classic Approach 
7 Here we are interested in political ideology, which means that we must distinguish it
from (on the one hand) what might be considered ideology more generally, and (on the
other) from non-ideological political beliefs.   While some theorists may argue that all
ideology is, by its nature, political, there is also a consensually defined more restricted
use of the word “political,” especially in democracies.  This is to refer to processes and
institutions turning on the quest to control the state machinery (or, analogously, other
organizations, but let us put such analogous usages to the side).  In most democracies,
this means an orientation to political parties, as these are the organizations that have
arisen to pursue such a quest.  I will accept this usage here, and be concerned with beliefs
that  are  understood  as  relevant  to  party  contestation.   Thus  someone  may  have  an
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opinion about a state policy, but if this is disconnected from partisan struggle, we do not
consider it a “political” issue (it may be, for example, a technical problem). 
8 Can we say something about the sorts of cognitive elements that might compose political
ideology?  For  example,  can we list  them?  When political  and social  analysts  define
ideology,  they  tend  to  give  extremely  broad  definitions,  usually  including  beliefs,
attitudes and values (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950: 2; Campbell et al., 1964: 111, 192; Jost, 2006:
653; Kerlinger, 1984: 13; Tedin, 1987: 65).  This basically runs the gamut of all possible
cognitive elements.  Could it be that we attempt to restrict the class of things included by
ideology in some other manner?  Are there specifiable qualities of  the elements that
constitute ideology? 
9 Most social scientists have assumed that if ideology is separable from some other political
beliefs or opinions,  it  is because ideology is intrinsically normative and generative (see
Lane, 1973: 85; for a recent synthesis see Hinich and Munger 1996).  A classic example of
an intrinsically  normative  definition of  ideology comes  from Downs (1957:  96):   “We
define an ideology as  a  verbal  image of  the good society  and of  the chief  means of
constructing such a society.”  This idea that ideological differences are fundamentally
about  differences  in  valuations,  both  abstract  and  concrete  (that  is,  “values”  and
“attitudes”), is widespread (e.g., Billig, 1984: 446; Rokeach, 1968: 123-124; Tedin, 1987: 65;
also see Jacoby, 2006; Jacoby and Sniderman 2006; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1987; cf. Minsky,
2006).    
10 Here I am going to use the United States as my running example, in part for reasons of
familiarity,  but  also  because  its  two-party  system  highlights  some  of  the  more
fundamental dynamics involved in political contestation, as this seems to be the form
that most politics spontaneously develop,  when there is not a well  developed system
deliberately designed to channel party formation in a particular direction (for an example
of such spontaneous dualistic politics,  see Barth,  1965).   The US,  like the UK,  had its
governmental system designed before the existence of stable party organizations, while
the  parliamentary  systems that  support  multi-party  systems were  designed after the
development of mass suffrage and the existence of parties,  and these were taken for
granted by constitution writers.    Now it  is  not necessarily  the case that  a  two-party
system leads to a division into “liberals” and “conservatives,” though I will argue below
that  there  is  actually  good reason to  expect  the  development  of  a  “unidimensional”
understanding of partisan differences.  However, as this is the case in the United States, I
use these terms to describe the consensual self-understanding of actors.  Thus if ideology
leads  to  political  choice,  it  does  through  “liberalism”  and  “conservatism.”    But  the
question  is  what  these  terms  mean—what  the  “ideologies”  are.  The  conventional
approach assumed that these were, above all else, oppositions of packages of values. 
11 Thus  conservatives  are  said  disproportionately  to  value  self-reliance,  limited
government,  and so  on,  while  liberals  are  thought  disproportionately  to  value equal
opportunity, tolerance, and so on (Klueger and Smith, 1986; Goren, 2004, 2005; Jost et al.,
2008).   It is such differences in values that we generally think about when we consider a
political “clash of cultures” (see DiMaggio et al., 1996). 
12 Now  this  approach  to  reducing  political  ideology  to  a  collection  of  “typically
conservative” or “typically liberal” values runs into the problems that most value- or
norm-based  explanations  have,  namely  that  our  key  explanatory  elements  are  very
proximate  to  that  which  is  to  be  explained—sometimes  crashing  into  tautology.
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 Explaining citizens’ preference for, say, a war effort or for welfare benefits by pointing to
their supposedly distinct values (militarism or equality)—that is, their political ideology—
is somewhat akin to explaining that  the reason opium induces sleep is  its  “soporific
quality” (cf.  Lau et  al.,  1991).   Of  course,  if  it  turns out  that  it  is  indeed values that
separates conservatives from liberals, one cannot complain that these are not the analytic
elements we wished for, but, given the proximity of such values to the opinions they are
to  explain,  we  must  be  somewhat  cautious  of  the  initial  appeal  of  the  approach  to
ideology that treats it as fundamentally about valuation. 
13 The second common understanding of ideology is that it is, as Downs (1957: 96) stressed,
generative: it facilitates our taking a stand on a particular issue (Higgs, 1987: 37-38; also
Lau et al.,  1991;  Zaller,  1992:  26).   In particular,  most analysts of public opinion have
embraced what Goren (2004) calls the “political sophistication” model.  Ideological values
are then combined with political information to produce non-random opinions on specific
matters.   
14 For example, consider persons in the United States attempting to decide whether they
will support a policy, say, one that gives benefits to out of work persons in American
inner cities (who are likely to be of Afro-American descent).  Our imaginary citizen first
draws on his ideological values—let us say equality and fairness—and then combines these
with what he knows about the world—that there is a great deal of unemployment, and
that the changing economic structure and persistent racism make it hard for American
blacks to get jobs no matter how hard they try—and produces an opinion, in this case, to
favor the policy.  In sum, according to this conception, values + beliefs = opinion; attitudes
are a fusion of otherwise separable prescriptive and descriptive cognitive elements. 
15 This suggests that ideologues should be those who have clear value commitments, and
mutually supporting value commitments.  Thus one would be hampered as an ideologue
were one to emphasize both individual freedom and state regulation, as increasing one
seems to logically  imply decreasing the other.   Further,  even in the absence of  such
logical contradiction, the nature of the world may be understood to be such that other
sorts of valuations are incompatible—for example, valuing equality of opportunity and
equality of outcome may be understood as incompatible given the existence of good and
bad luck distributed across persons, whether randomly or not.  Finally, this conception
suggests that ideologues without sufficient information about the world would be unable
to form opinions, as they would only have the “ought” part of their cognitive orientation,
and not the “is” part. 
 
Problems with the Classic Approach 
16 However, there have been a few recurrent anomalies for this approach.  The first problem
is that ideology seems to have a direct effect on many policy preferences that cannot be
explained  according  to  a  chain  of  reasoning  whereby  the  abstract  principles  of  the
ideology  imply  more  proximate  principles  that,  when  combined  with  political
information, lead to the preference.  For example, we might imagine that (A) a liberal
ideology leads  people  to  favor,  in  principle,  (B)  racial  equality,  which in  turn might
influence (C) a particular policy choice such as one involving regulation of housing law.
 However, well informed ideologues choose the “correct” side of some issue even when
they do not hold the beliefs that should mediate between ideology and choice (Federico
and Sidanius 2002; Sniderman et al. 1991: 65- 67, 81-84).  That is, A seems linked directly
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to C, without mediation by B.  Political psychologists have generally assumed that just as
you can never be too smart or too rich, you can never be too ideologically consistent:
 indeed, they have tended to assume that such consistency (in the sense of the work of
Festinger, 1957,  Feldman,  1966,  and  Abelson,  et  al.,  1968,  is  a  prerequisite  for good
political  participation.   For  this  reason,  the  “hyper-consistency”  of  well-informed
ideologues has not been treated as problematic, even though it forces us to reevaluate our
assumptions about how ideologues reason. 
17 The second problem is that it turned out that this sort of hyper-consistency wasn’t quite
matched by a similarly high degree of consistency regarding the fundamental values.
 This in no way implies that any conviction is wanting among ideologues—however, this
conviction appears to be turned on and off  selectively.   Those who argue against the
separation of church and state when it is a matter of their religion (usually Christians in
the US), making recourse to very abstract values, had no problem arguing for this same
separation  when it  came to  others‘  religion.   And similarly,  those  who were  used  to
arguing for the separation of church and state when it came to battling the conservative
Christians, switched over to arguing against too stringent a separation when this became
linked to intolerance of Muslims.  Most wonderfully, Jarret Crawford and Eneda Xhambazi
(2013) studied how Americans evaluated two different recent populist movements, the
“Tea Party,”  which became associated with right  wing causes,  and the “Occupy Wall
Street” movement,  which became associated with the left  wing.   They show that Tea
Party supporters tend to appeal to values of the right of protest when asked about the Tea
Party, but appeal to the importance of social order when asked about Occupy Wall Street;
and Occupy Wall Street supporters tend to appeal to values of the right of protest when
asked about Occupy Wall Street, but appeal to the importance of social order when asked
about the Tea Party. 
18 The third problem has to do with the factual basis for opinion formation.  If the “values”
part didn’t seem to work as it should, neither did the “knowledge” part.  Since Converse’s,
1964  classic  work,  political  psychologists  have  been  forced  to  acknowledge  that  few
Americans have enough factual information to allow them to make the sorts of decisions
that were assumed by the model of political reasoning.  While it must be acknowledged
that there are other polities in which the average citizen has more information than does
the average  citizen  of  the  US,  what  is  key  about  the  American  example  is  that  it
demonstrates that lack of factual data hampers opinion formation only slightly.  And this
is because the “information” held by an average citizen is,  when one considers what
would  be  needed  to  make  a  rigorous  deduction  as  to  a  political  choice,  necessarily
extremely partial.   Consider the question of  which candidate to favor in an election.
 Presumably, one would need to know what the candidate would actually do when elected,
which of course is beyond anyone’s actual knowledge.  Thus even if voters knew what
candidates promised to do, they would fall short of a decent model of political reasoning
through no fault of their own.  But they would also need to know how the promised
actions would affect their own interests, which would require a great deal of knowledge
about the world and its causal texture, knowledge that few of us have. 
19 And to top it all off, while the evidence that ideology gives us values gets weaker the
closer we look, it becomes more and more plausible that ideology gives us knowledge—
which might seem contradictory.  Thus the fourth problem with the conventional view is
that ideology gives citizens exactly the wrong cognitive element.  In fact, differences in
ideology seems to correlate much more strongly with differences in descriptive statements
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than they do with differences in purely prescriptive ones (cf. Rumelhart, 1989; Kurtz et al.,
1999).  And this is because, as Rokeach, 1968 always held, the thing about values is that
they’re all good, considered singly.  It’s only in trade-offs that people begin to distinguish
themselves.  So people can agree with one another in their value commitments, while still
having diametrically opposed opinions.   
20 Now to some extent, the way that this happens has long been well understood.  Because
there are usually a variety of competing sources of information (such as newspapers) that
are  more  or  less  strongly  associated  with  different  ideologies,  ideologues  have  the
capacity to choose the information source that is likely to disproportionately report facts
(or  would-be  facts)  that  support  their  previous  position.   Further,  there  is  general
evidence from psychology that when we come across information that contradicts our
strongly  held  positions,  we  are  less  likely  to  pursue  it  (e.g.,  read  it),  less  likely  to
understand if we do pursue, and more likely to forget if we do understand. 
21 But even more, it seems that ideology provides “knowledge” about the world indirectly
(Lau  et  al.,  1991;  Dawson,  2001).   Let  us  return  to  the  example  used  above,  namely
 Americans determining whether to support a policy for unemployed blacks.  We walked
through the traditional understanding of how an ideologue might be led to support the
program (values + beliefs = opinions)—a commitment to fairness, plus a belief that there is
discrimination against blacks, leads to favoring the policy.  Yet many conservatives do not
favor the policy.  Could this be because they (unlike liberals) value “self-reliance”?  It is
certainly true that they do, but as shown by Martin and Desmond (2010), so do liberals—
in fact, there are only very small differences between liberals and conservatives here.
 Where they do differ greatly is in their belief as to how worthy the recipients are (how
likely the poor are to be trying to solve their own problems). 
22 Now this issue refers to a matter of external fact.  We would imagine that at least one of
the two positions has to be wrong.  Could we determine this through social science?  The
actual wording of the item analyzed by Martin and Desmond is this:  “Most poor people
these days would rather take assistance from the government than make it on their own
through hard work” (agree or disagree).  Who are “poor people”?  Only adults?  Not on
disability?  Under retirement age?  Do we agree that it  is  an “either/or”?  And,  most
important, just how hard does someone have to work to “make it,” and how far do they
“make it”?  Are we talking about turning down a $30,000 a year union job with medical
benefits so as to stay on TANF, or not giving up food stamps when one is working two
jobs, each below minimum wage, each with erratic hours?  Taking the question literally,
we scratch our heads, and wonder how could anyone answer it with confidence?  The
further we pursue the matter, the more implausible the classical understanding seems,
and the more difficult it is to salvage it. 
 
 Political sides and political action 
Sides and parties 
23 Given  that  the  classic  logic  seems  implausible,  different  political  psychologists  have
contributed different possible “heuristics” that citizens can use to construct their ideas
and actions (here see recently the work of Baldassarri,  2012).   One popular theory of
political action is a “rejectionist” one which directly parallels the falsificationist logic of
Karl Popper (see, e.g., Riker, 1982).  Rather than reject hypotheses that fail tests, voters
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reject candidates who have, in the past, failed their interests.  In the United States, this
dynamic is popularly called “throw the bums out”.  The assumption is that members of a
party in power are retained until  their performances falls below some threshold in a
multiparty system, at which point voters will move to replace them, either with their
opponents in a two-party system, or with the party that makes the most credible claim to
have always argued against the problems that the voters retrospectively identify.2 
24 There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that these heuristics are used by voters, and
that they can be of fundamental importance in a two party system. However, such a
heuristic can only be used to choose whom to vote for (and it does not, in itself, generate
an ideology that could inform other choices); further, it really only deals with switching,
while we know that most of the time, most citizens stick with their party through thick
and thin. 
25 Is there a more general way in which the choice of a side may be understood to be a
plausible expression of actors’ interests, one that does not require switching back and
forth?  It might be, if sides in terms of political parties correspond to recognized sides of a
social cleavage.  In this case, we may not require actors to think through each and every
position.  Political reasoning is a “package deal,” not “a la carte,” in that when we choose
a side,  we choose all  the opinions  held by the party  representing that  side,  kit  and
caboodle.   Thus if  workers support a party claiming to be a workers’  party,  they are
treated as reasoning well;  if  they do not,  it  is  assumed that,  in the absence of other
explanation, that they are failing to reason.  Of course, everyone will recognize that a
party that claims to be for the workers may not really be for the workers, or even if it is,
that the party faces the same problems of incomplete knowledge that individuals face. 
26 However,  even bracketing this,  such a conception of identity-based politics runs into
problems if we have a polity that has what we call “cross-cutting cleavages” (Simmel,
1958 [1923]; Lipset, 1960)—that some workers are Catholics and others Protestant, say, so
that it is unclear whether Protestant and Catholic workers should band together and form
a Workers’ Party, against Protestant and Catholic capitalists, or whether Catholic workers
and Catholic  capitalists  should form a Catholic  party against  Protestant  workers  and
capitalists.   Thus  the  heuristic  of  choosing  sides  sometimes  brackets  what  is  most
important to us—the question of why voters choose the side they do. 
27 Without denying the force of this objection, we may still find that the importance of such
“choosing up sides” on opinion formation is not restricted to affiliating with a particular
pre-given program.  Sniderman et al. (1991) propose that one way that only somewhat-
informed citizens can generate their beliefs is to consider what their enemies are likely to
hate, and choose that.  (They call this the “likability” heuristic, but it has more to do with
disliking than liking).   There are four things to note about this proposal.  The first is that
there is indeed evidence to support it; and the second is that it radically undercuts the
classical model.  The third is that we are being forced to take a view of ideation that is
compatible with a pragmatist perspective—we need to understand what people are trying
to do with their ideas.  And the fourth is that it implicitly returns us to a notion of politics
that few American political scientists have found appealing, namely that it is a struggle
between camps first and foremost (I will return to this shortly). 
28 But this also leads to an interesting implication—if politics involves the establishment of
webs of alliance and opposition, and this in turn is used by political actors to generate
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opinions, then we may find that Marx’s original conception of the nature of ideology may
have a great deal to offer us.  I turn to a brief recapitulation of his argument. 
 
Back to Marx 
29 Here we must remind ourselves of what Marx and Engels’s own position was when, in
1845,  they  wrote  The  German  Ideology,  given  that  it  has  been  creatively  re-read  by
generations of putative followers with very different goals in mind.  In particular, faced
with the general rejection of their program by most European workers, Marxists often
formulated various versions of “ideology” that explained why things didn’t go the way
they  had  said  (and  hoped)  they  would.   Ideology  became  (in  this  later  theory)  a
surprisingly effective way of controlling masses of persons—exactly the opposite of the
claims made by Marx and Engels. 
30 For coming from the context of the Young Hegelian movement, where such claims as to
the mystifying powers of ideas were rampant, Marx and Engels, in diametrical opposition,
denied the importance of such ideas and instead treated them as largely epiphenomenal.
 They began their work with a parody of the Young Hegelian way of thinking, which was
to assume that our ideas have somehow achieved a position of power over us.  In contrast,
Marx and Engels emphasized that if ideas ever seem to be fetters, it is because they are
“the mere images of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which move the mode
of production of life, and the form of intercourse coupled with it” (1976 [1845-6]: 45). 
31 In any case, what is ideology?  To Marx and Engels, it was organized beliefs at a high level
of abstraction; they used the term to indicate include morality, religion, metaphysics,
politics, law and judicial theory, and certainly speculative philosophy.  While it is not the
case that all beliefs are ideological, these ones are because they are idealized, universalized
and  detached expressions  of  actual  social  relations.   For  example,  the  concept  of
“freedom” central to German idealist philosophy was, argued Marx and Engels, an ideal
expression of the material relations of market orientation that characterized nineteenth
century bourgeois society.  Further, this notion was universalized, in that it wasn’t simply
freedom-to-buy-and-sell, but freedom tout court that was supposedly being talked about.
 Finally, this was detached in that rather than accept that this freedom comes from these
material relations, thinkers believed it to occupy a special position in a realm of ideal
elements. 
32 The generation of such ideology, while indeed left to specialists, is not the result of a
clever conspiracy, but rather a natural expression of the division of labor.  This splits
mental  from  manual  labor,  leading  to  ideational  production  by  persons  who  are
themselves detached from production.  The very connection of ideational production and
material  production explains  the detachment of  ideas  from materiality,  as  ideational
producers, like others, generalize their own experiences (which are now set against those
of others, due to the inherent contradictions of the division of labor).3 
33 Thus ideology is a generalization of social relations; it is the ideal form of the actual
relations, seen from the perspective of one position in this set of relations, but
universalized, idealized and abstracted.  Marx and Engels, thinking at the largest scale,
were of course concerned specifically with the general relations of production in a social
world—those that, seen sociologically, appear as class relations, and that, seen juridically,
appear as property relations.  My argument is not that political ideology is some form of
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these class relations, but rather, that it is to specifically political relations what Marx’s
ideology is to the relations of production.   
 
What is political action? 
34 To understand the nature of political relations, we must first answer the question, ‘what
is political action?’, for we shall see that these relations are the outcome of specifically
political action.   To attempt to answer this question, we can turn to two sources, one
historical,  and  the  other  contemporary.   That  is,  we  examine  where  the  concept  of
political action first arose, and we also look for how we use it in contemporary speech; we
will prefer the results of this sort of exercise to conclusions arising via deduction from
first theoretical principles. 
35 Regarding the first question, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s (1958) analysis of political action
in  ancient  Greece.   Political  action—action  in  the  polis—was  paradigmatically  speech,
speech made in the open air.  Second, it was speech that mattered, and it mattered because
others could be convinced.  Yet not all needed to be convinced in order to win the day.
 Despite  the  attempt  of  Plato  to  turn  all  of  politics  into  the  application  of  abstract
principles  of  the  good,  even  afterwards,  politics  required  careful  attention  to  the
cultivation of a core set of adherents and, in many cases, the acceptance that some others
would  never  be  persuaded  to  join  one’s  side.   Even  in  an  unorganized,  plebiscitary
democracy, it is not necessary to sway all, but enough of those who mattered, so that the
others could not prevent one’s own proposals from being realized. 
36 And this  brings  us  to  a  second aspect  of  politics  not  emphasized by Arendt,  but  by
another German thinker of decidedly different extraction and sensibilities, namely Carl
Schmitt.  Politics, Schmitt (2008 [1932]: 26f) argued, is fundamentally about the division of
others into friends and enemies.  Schmitt famously focused somewhat obsessively, as did
those of his followers who joined the Nazi movement, on the rejection of the outsider, the
enemy, the stranger.  I think we can excise that aspect from the more lasting aspects of
his thought.  These are not only the division into friends and enemies, but his emphasis
on the fact that no one but the political actor can identify who one’s enemy ought to be. 
37 The brutalist sound of Schmitt’s writing—and his importance for Nazi political thought—
may have scared many democratic theorists away from his argument.  But it seems to fit
with other, seemingly radically different, understandings of the political, such as that of
Arendt.  Because what seems to be distinctive about political action is the assembling of
allies into groups to pursue the project of control over whatever degree of organizational
apparatus a state has.   
38 Further,  this  conception seems  to  fit  the  way  the  term “political  action”  is  used  in
everyday life.  Of course, where there is a developed political system, we will use the term
to refer to anything related to this system, especially insofar as it involves parties.  But
more generally, a decision is said to be “political” not only if (as Weber would say) it
tends  to  involve  striving  for  power,  but  if  it  specifically  does  so  by  making  some
substantive decision a means for the furtherance of one’s own side at the expense of
others.  Indeed, even if the action does not noticeably affect the distribution of power, but
only of other good things, we would term it political (or “playing politics”) if it is oriented
to the division into friends and enemies.  Formulaically, one might say that when we use
politics  only  to  “line  our  own pocket”  (increase  our  individual  material  wealth),  we
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engage in “corruption.”  But when we line the pockets of our friends—not just a few close
ones, but our specifically political friends—that is politics. 
39 Finally, when we consider the sort of action that characterizes an accomplished political
actor,  what  we  find  is  that,  contrary  to  the  implications  of  Schmitt’s  focus  on  the
rejection of the enemy, it often involves increasing one’s stock of friends.  Eliminating the
enemy is usually left to generals—it is courting him that is the task of the politician.  That
is, if political action involves making alliances between friends, a key way to triumph is to
make one of your enemy’s friends (and hence your potential enemy) into a friend.  Thus
specifically political relations are the product of political action—they are the webs of
alliance and rivalry, friendship and enmity, that constitute political sides. 
40 The result, then, is that political actors, even when they act individually, are (insofar as
they are carrying out political action) doing so with an eye to their position in a web of
alliances.  In particular, where there is a well developed party system, these alliances take
the form of parties.  We go on to explore the nature of such parties, and the implications
for ideology. 
 
 Aggregation and alliance 
Parties and alliances 
41 Different theories of political party formation begin from very different premises.  Some
of  the  most  elegant  of  these  sets  of  premises  would not  be  seriously  proposed as  a
historically valid account of party formation.  Yet they can prove useful analytic tools for
understanding  equilibrium  action  in  a  developed  party  system.   For  example,  some
theories assume that all individuals are distributed on a one or two dimensional space of
preferences,  and  that  parties  arise  to  compete  for  the  allegiance  of  such  atomized
individuals.  That is, the goal of political action is no different from market purchasing—
each individual has a set of preferences, and she makes choices to maximize her utility.   
42 To derive this approach, consider every political actor to have a “portfolio” of goals that
she is pursuing; in our extreme starting point of total individualization, this portfolio is
identical to each actor’s preferences (this will change as we pursue the development of
parties).  Although this approach does not require any partition between material and
non-material  interests,  material  here  meaning “narrowly  economic,”  for  purposes  of
simplicity, we will imagine that this is the case, and that people are able to correctly
ascertain  their  material  interests  as  well.   Further,  we  will  here  imagine  that  actors
pursue  only  their  “material”  interests,  as  opposed  to  abstract  and/or  transcendent
values.  The reason for these assumptions is that, as we shall see, they allow us to begin an
analytic pursuit of ideology without assuming its presence, as we would if we were to
allow for “ideological interests.” 
43 I emphasize that I do not believe this pure model of atomized decision making to have
any descriptive utility, but find it remarkably useful as a thought experiment.  First, if
individuals were able to choose to maximize their material interests, there is no reason
that they would need to appeal to ideology at all.   Their justifications of their action,
should these be required, could be made honestly on the basis of what is sometimes called
“pocketbook” interests.   
What is ideology?
Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas, 77 | 2015
10
44 Now let us continue this analytic account by allowing for party “aggregation,” basically
by following the logic of Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004), who examine nationalization
in terms of the strength of party attachments across regions.  For them, nationalization
refers to an agglomerative process whereby local candidates throw in their lot with one
another and, crucially, are recognized by voters as doing such.  This suggests a useful, if
historically inaccurate, analytic reconstruction of the process of party formations, which
we can term “topic clustering.”  That is, all individuals are originally located in a topos, a
spatial position, and some of these positions, originally distinct, become aggregated to
make a larger area.  We imagine that all persons are distributed in a space, call it “social
space,” such that those who are closer to one another are more likely to share both their
actual interests, and their perceived interests.  From this simple set-up, we can model the
development of a party system. 
 
Intersection and union 
45 Each actor may initially be considered to pursue his own individual interests, but also, as
a means to this end, to want to form alliances with others.  We will imagine that there are
two ways in which this alliance can be cemented, which we can call “logrolling” and
“suppression.” 
46 “Logrolling” is a term from American politics to refer to when two actors or two parties
make an exchange relation over their support for certain issues (Buchanan and Tullock,
1999 [1958]).4  If there is one person or party (A) which cares a great deal about issue X,
and prefers outcome x1 over x2, but is largely indifferent to issue Y, and another party (B)
which cares a great deal about issue Y, and prefers outcome y2 over y1, but is largely
indifferent to issue X, then it makes sense for the two to join forces on a program (x1, y2). 
47 “Suppression” is  a  term used by Mische (2009)  for  the  political  practice  required to
cement an alliance by A and B who share some, but not all, interests.  Using the approach
to the relation between persons and ideas associated with Breiger’s (1974) conception of
duality,  Mische  proposed  considering  set-theoretic  intersection  a  possible  tactic  to
facilitate alliance.  That is, if A‘s goals are the set {a, b, c, d, e} and B‘s goals are the set {c, d,
e, f, g}, it would make sense for A and B to join forces on a program of {c, d, e}; to do so,
however, A would need to suppress interest in a and b, while B would need to suppress
attention to f and g.  Why?  Because we assuyme that some members of A don’t approve of
f (or g), which is why this is not part of A‘s program; ditto B and a and b.  Note that while
logrolling adds some (relatively trivial) “interests” to an actor’s “portfolio,” suppression
removes some.  Suppression therefore tends to make an actor’s portfolio more abstract,
while logrolling makes it more complex. 
48 Now there is certainly evidence that political elites perform logrolling and suppression
with alacrity when necessary.  But things may be quite different for their supporters, if
these are necessarily brought along to defend the resulting platform.  The supporters are
not always privy to the historical sequences, the back-room deals, or simply the worldly
wisdom that has led to an alliance’s position, and yet they may need to be in a position of
defending these to others, or to themselves.  It is my claim here that ideology is citizens’
way of comprehending the nature of the alliances in which they find themselves. 
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Parties as contours 
49 Imagine that we let this process continue—at any time, two groupings fuse, to make a
single one.  We began with a very simple dyadic alliance between two actors.  Let us now
imagine that, faced with other dyadic alliances, one dyad wishes to join with another.
 And then one of these alliances will fuse with another alliance, and so on and so forth.
 With each iteration, the joint dynamics of suppression and logrolling should lead the
ideology to become both more abstract and more complex, respectively.    
50 We also imagine that the fusing groups are “adjacent” in the social space (that is, there is
no third party that is  “between” and separating the two).   In many cases,  the fusion
process will stop far short of two parties, though in single member, “first past the post,”
district  elections,  as  Duverger  (1963  [1954])  has  shown,  there  is  a  strong  tendency
towards a two party solution.  Note that there is no reason to imagine that the resulting
groups are simple shapes, such as spheres or cubes.  The precise distribution of persons in
this space (whether it is more or less even), like the precise “path dependence” of the
historical process that has occurred (which alliances happen first), can lead the emerging
alliances to take strange shapes.   Each party,  in other words,  can be thought of  as a
contour that snakes through the space in some way.  A party system, similarly, can be
understood as the set of contours that divides persons up into a set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive classes.  We have assumed, by the adjacency criterion, that these contours
are all single curves, and hence that each party is one continuous shape. 
51 For  example,  imagine  that  persons  are  distributed  in  some  two-dimensional  space,
though we make no assumptions about the nature of the dimensions (thus there don’t
necessarily need to be “two” actual principles organizing people—all that matters is that
their  pattern  of  likenesses  and  differences  is  one  that  can  be  represented  in  a  two
dimensional space), and we choose two dimensions only for convenience.  Persons who
are near each other in space tend to agree on what they want, and people who are far
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Figure 1 Party contours that induce unidimensionality
52  Now in this case, we see that the parties seem to be oriented to one dimension (even if
there is no clearly namable “thingness” to this dimension, like a degree of some quality),
and it would seem very plausible that actors, attempting to understand the logic of the
political system, would rely on unidimensionality.  That is, they would speak of others
being (for example) “to the right” or “to the left” of them.  In other words, the ideology of
a dimension (such as liberal-conservative) would arise as actors’ theory of the principles of
their own action.  What would best express their set of alliances is a single dimension
(even though, as we have seen, they are actually in a two-dimensional space). 
53 In  other  cases,  however,  contours  are  not  drawn  such  that  a  “dimensional”
understanding seems plausible.  This then leads to a challenge for political actors who
need to theorize the logic of their party.  This sort of complexity often arises when parties
develop as an agglomeration of smaller clumps, most notably, local parties.   
54 For example, the contours shown in figure 2 are not compatible with a unidimensional
subjective representation of the party system; it is not even possible for them to use
something like  “moderation”  versus  “extremism” as  would be  the  case  if  they  were
arranged as concentric circles.  How can they come up with any understanding of what
joins the members of a party?  In many cases like this, it seems that party members will
simply fall back on the issue of whether or not they are currently in power.  Those in
power may believe that they are united by their “competence” (which basically means
that they are in a position to make decisions, some of which turn out to work reasonably
well), while those who are out of power may believe that they are united in terms of their
resistance to “tyranny.”5  Such allies,  should they come into power,  may be honestly
confused at how they suddenly turn out to always have had antithetical views. 
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 Figure 2 Party contours that prove incompatibility with unidimensionality
55 In sum, this analytic account—one that starts from simplistic and unrealistic preferences
—suggests that parties may develop as contours that connect persons who to a great
extent vary from one another in their interests and goals.  Although this derivation is
fanciful,  the resulting image of  parties,  I  contend,  is  not.   Now we can compare this
analytic derivation to a more historically plausible one, regarding the origin of political
parties. 
 
Parties from scratch 
56 Now historically,  it  seems  that  in  those  cases  in  which  parties  arise  “from scratch”
(before  the  development  of  a  democratic  institutional  infrastructure  deliberately
designed  to  channel  party  formation  in  particular  directions),  we  still  find  the
development of local structures of opposition, generally based on pre-existing vertical
structures, whether kin, land-ownership, or patronage (Barth, 1965; Martin, 2009).  There
are then alliances of  such local  parties  across  these regions,  as  elites  begin to make
arrangements  so  that  they  can  coordinate  against  common  enemies.   Many  party
structures then develop as odd assemblages of different groups across regions.  As masses
get more involved, and parties begin to appeal to category-based interests of actors (such
as class, religion) as opposed to particularistic ones (such as being a dependent of such-
and-such  an  elite  family),  parties  then  develop  as  patchworks  of  different  types  of
category across different regions. 
57 This patchwork nature is clearest in large countries with two-party systems.  Thus in the
United States,  the major  parties  have always  been alliances  of  very different  sets  of
interests—for example, the Democratic party from the late 19th century through the 20th
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involved a coalition between anti-black whites in the South and blacks in the North,
farmers in the South and industrial union members in the North. 
58 Thus each party may be understood as an amalgam, a clumping of different groups, an
accretion of ties of alliance.  The logic of this amalgam is only partially consistent, as it is
equivalent to sailing on a ship that is constantly being changed and rebuilt—some parts
are old and no longer of any use, but have not yet been changed, while others are brand
new and, though they fit poorly with much of the old, are expected to be guiding the
development of the future structure. 
59 This raises a serious practical problem for adherents, namely how to conceptualize the
nature of their party and therefore the principles of their political action.  For political
action, we recall, is paradigmatically about the favoring of friends.   But the citizen does
not possess a roster of other party members, complete with each’s occupation, religion,
education, and so on, let alone knowledge of what these others want.  Hence she is faced
with the question, who is my neighbor, my ally, anyway? 
 
A structural anecdote 
60 Let me give a (true) anecdote to explain my meaning.  I once saw a pickup truck in my
home town that had two bumperstickers on the rear.  One had a representation of the
American flag, and words next to it:  “One nation, one flag, one language.”  The other side
had the Confederate flag.  This is the flag used by the short-lived Southern confederation
of states during the Civil War, when they tried to break away from the Union in order to
preserve their “peculiar institution,” that is, slavery of Africans and their descendants.
 They wanted there to be two countries, and two flags.  Indeed, the truck itself had two
flags on it!  Yet the other sticker emphasized the importance of only having one flag and
one country.  This seems, in a way, to be the acme of political inconsistency, and might be
understood as demonstrating the complete incapacity of the owner to participate in any
sort of meaningful politics. 
61 But quite the contrary, it demonstrated a mastery of the political landscape.  Displaying
the Confederate flag in the United States does not imply anti-black racism.  However, it
does imply a lack of  concern with being “called out” as a racist—it implies fearlessly
embracing aspects of American political culture without apology, even though these are
associated with racism.  In other words, this flag does not prove racist animus (though
racist animus might well be sufficient to produce the desire to display the flag), it does
demonstrate  anti-anti-racism.   Whether  or  not  it  is  anti-black,  it  is  certainly  anti-
Northern-liberal. 
62 The other bumpersticker, however, comes in response to certain political initiatives to
ease the barriers to American citizens, residents, and possibly others who read (or speak)
Spanish but not English.  Whether it is printing all government documents in Spanish as
well  as  English,  offering  bilingual  instruction  in  the  schools,  or  printing  street  and
highway signs in Spanish, this movement has been pushed largely by political liberals.  It
is opposed both on practical grounds in some cases (for example, the increased cost of
equipping schools for multilingual instruction), but also for reasons having to do with the
implicit position of different groups in a status hierarchy—whether English speakers lose
their implicit priority and their capacity to feel “at home” everywhere.   
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63 What is key is that the Democratic party has tended to get the lion’s share of support
from both Blacks and Spanish speakers (with the exception of Cuban refugees), and has
pursued the policies that are generally considered advantageous to both.  In placing these
two,  seemingly  contradictory,  bumperstickers  on  his  truck,  our  unknown  actor  was
successfully indicating his opposition to the liberal  coalition.  (Further,  given that his
truck’s  perfect  paintjob  demonstrated  that  it  was  a  stranger  to  serious  work,  its
pointlessly excessive size also embodied opposition to environmental conservation.) 
64 In sum, the argument here is that what ideology is, is actors’ theorization of their politics,
that is, it is their attempt to come up with an abstract representation of the political
alliance system in which they are in, and the nature of their opponents.  They may be
logically inconsistent, but are politically consistent (and teleologically consistent), when
they develop a set of vaguely interrelated themes that help them always orient to their
friends in a positive manner, and to their enemies in a negative manner. 
 
Political reasoning in practice 
65 We  are  now  ready  to  return  to  the  puzzle  we  started  with.   We  saw  that  political
reasoning doesn’t follow the logic which was first hoped would characterize an informed,
but ideologically driven,  populace,  namely that (ideological)  values +  beliefs =  opinions.
 Instead, we saw that ideology seems to provide people not with values, but with beliefs.
 But how does this happen?  It seems that the “knowledge” that ideology gives us is that
which would justify our side and strip our enemies of their justification.   
66 To return to our running example (citizens trying to decide whether to support a policy
that  would  provide assistance  to  the  out  of  work  poor  and/or  blacks),  the  classic
conception imagines a person beginning with the value of equality, adding the facts about
discrimination (say) and producing support for the policy.  But those who oppose the
policy do not claim to be any less enthusiastic about the value of equality, and, unless we
simply  dismiss  their  protests  on  the  basis  of  the  fact  that  they  reject  the  policy  (a
pathological  form  of  science,  in  which  we  prove  our  claim  by  throwing  out  any
information that doesn’t fit it), we have a puzzle.  That puzzle, of course, is solved by the
fact that the conservatives disagree about the world of  fact,  not that of  values—they
“know” that the beneficiaries of the program are undeserving. 
67 When  we  think  about  it,  how  do either  of  our  hypothetical  ideologues  have  any
information about the worthiness of the poor?  They both get it from the nature of the
alliance system in which they are embedded.  The rule is, simply put, “me and my friends
are good” and “those others are bad.”  Thus it seems like the actual calculus of opinion
formation is “sides + self-concept = opinion.”   
68 It would be reasonable to object that our allies are not assigned to us at birth; we are free
to choose them, and so rather than alliance being the cause of  our conceptions,  our
conceptions may be the cause of our alliance, as we choose our side based on how we
evaluate the members of the coalition.  There is no need to deny that this can happen…
but there is not much evidence that it is a major contributor to the variance we are
examining.  First, party identification is basically assigned to us at birth, in the sense that
partisanship correlates highly between parents and their children. 
69 Now to some degree, this comes because other aspects of individuals that are associated
with party (region, ethnicity, religion, occupation) are associated across generations.  Yet
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there is something further about partisan attachments that resists change.  And when
people do change their partisanship, they are often aligning the party choice with the rest
of their life.  You don’t get a membership card in a left party with your sociology PhD, but
you nearly might as well. 
70 And when we choose a side, we find that it does come with alliances already built in.  Not
all political actors will necessarily accept that package deal.  But to the extent that they
do not,  they are  hampered as  political  actors.   That  is,  the  American Democrat  who
concedes that regulation of handgun sales is unconstitutional, the Republican who admits
that opposing abortion rights is unconstitutional, are going to be less impressive fighters
for their  side than those who have no such doubts.   And that means that the urban
Southern democrat, the rich Republican woman (in these cases), may need to figure out
how to encompass the programs of their unchosen, and unwished-for, allies. 
71 But more important,  if  they are to have a true ideology,  they must have a coherent
theorization of what unites their sides—and it is my argument that this is nothing other
than the sides themselves, idealized, universalized, and detached.  This might be plausible
to most when they consider the nineteenth century European systems—the “socialism” of
the “socialist” party is the worker-intellectual alliance; the “liberalism” of the “liberal”
party is the capitalist-tradesman alliance.  My argument is, however, that this is generally
true,  and  that  this  is  how  it  is  possible  for  ideology  to  provide  people  with  an
understanding of how they should decide more specific issues. 
72 Thus to return one last time to the running example, Martin and Desmond (2010) found
that ideologues of high political information were more likely than others to be wrong
about the proportion of the US poor who are black, seriously overestimating this.  That is,
their knowledge was that-which-helps-us-know- -what-we-want-to-fight-about.  But even
more, when they were presented with a vignette that presented them with the ontology
which their opponents would have believed to be the case, they paused significantly before
answering.  That is, they recognized that some situations are different from others—good
for their enemies.   
73 We saw above that it was difficult to imagine how any person could truly come up with an
answer to many of the questions that respondents are presented with in surveys.  How
can  anyone  answer  with  confidence  a  question  asking  us  to  generalize  about  the
subjective nature of the members of a vaguely defined class?  Yet ideologues do, and they
come up with different answers.  But where do they get these from?  If we consider the
positions on a continuum from running liberal to conservative as “politicized” in the
sense  of  being  oriented  toward  political  conflict,  then  we  may  propose  that  the
“knowledge” that comes with an ideological position is that which best facilitates this
politicization.  It is not simply that people believe that which furthers their “interests,”
although there are undoubtedly tendencies in this direction.  It is that ideology leads
people to “put into the world” ontologies that facilitate opinion formation such that they
favor allies, and oppose enemies. 
 
 Conclusion 
74 The classic sociology of knowledge attempted to link the ideas associated with groups,
especially large scale strata of society, such as classes, to their position in the overall
social  structure.   This  effort  famously suffered from two grave problems.  The first  is
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known as the problem of imputation (see Child, 1941), and is largely a technical problem
—it is  very difficult  to know what “the group” actually thinks.   Imagine that  we are
attempting to determine the ideology of workers.   Do we look at what the leaders of
workers’ movements say?  They may be different from other workers (indeed, they may
not be workers themselves).  And they may not say what they actually think, but what
will accomplish their goals.  And if we use books to determine what they thought, we may
be finding things that have to do with the characteristics of texts first and foremost, and
less about what was key to the workers’ ideology. 
75 These problems can to some extent be mitigated by the use of survey data, though this
has its own serious limitations and interpretive difficulties.   But there has been little
enthusiasm for  the  project  of  a  classical  sociology  of  knowledge  using  survey  data,
presumably because of the second problem.  This is the one that Mannheim pointed to,
one which we might now call that of the “mutually assured destruction” that came from
reducing others’  claims  to  their  position  in  social  structure.   To  the  extent  that  the
sociology of knowledge became swept up in the quest to “unmask” others—to show that
their pious ideals were “really” self-serving, driven by material interests—the analytic
tools turned out to be too good.  Even those armed with critique are vulnerable to it.  The
all-around critique ends up destroying “man’s confidence in human thought in general”
(Mannheim, 1936 [1929]: 45). 
76 This totalizing approach undermined itself and hence was abandoned, even though it had
not been demonstrated to be incorrect.  But it may be that the problem was not so much
in the logic as the application—the assumption that knowledge in any sphere of activity
was rooted in a global position may have been overly convenient, and it could well be that
(as Bourdieu [e.g., 1969 / 1966] assumed), the relation between any ideational production
and  social  structure  is  specific  to  positon  in  a  particular  field.   If  so,  then  political
ideology is unlikely to be related to general “class position,” except insofar as this is
mediated by alignment with a particular political side, especially a political party. 
77 My argument is that this restricted version of the classical approach is in fact correct, and
that this explains characteristics of political ideology that are otherwise obscure:  the fact
that its planks are mutually supporting despite the presence of logical contradictions; the
importance of prescription despite the valuations expressed being uninterpretable in any
literal fashion; the generative nature of ideology despite the fact that what it seems to
provide is an ontology.  And, quite elegantly, focusing on the pragmatic difficulties that
confront actors as they struggle to make sense of their position in a largely unwished-for
web of alliances, we find that the core of Marx’s understanding of ideology is the most
reasonable explanation for the resources that actors have to guide their political action. 
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NOTES
1. Some of the ideas here were first worked out in collaboration with Matt Desmond, and I am
grateful to him for continuing dialogue, friendship and inspiration.
2. This often involves the idea that certain issues are “owned” by certain parties, in contrast to
issues for which multiple parties can each make different, but still plausible, claims to have a
valid solution. The party that “owned” the issue associated with the rejection of the party-in-
power is expected to profit from this rejection more than other parties.
3. “Everyone believes his craft to be the true one. Illusions regarding the connection between
their craft and reality are more likely to be cherished by them because of the very nature of the
craft....The judge, for example, applies the code, he therefore regards legislations as the real,
active driving force” (notes made by Marx in the manuscript at the end of the Feuerbach section,
in 1976 [1845-6]: 92).
4. The term comes from woodsmen’s practice of helping each other roll their felled logs from one
place to another, a difficult act for one alone.
5. A very good example of this is the American Whig party of the 1840s-50s. Composed of “out”
factions  across  all  regions  of  the  United  States,  and,  due  to  recent  changes  in  patterns  of
international economics, suddenly bereft of any coherent economic ideology that might unite
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them, they became honestly convinced that they had a moral objection to “tyranny,” which for
them  simply  meant  continual  Democratic  dominance  of  the  national  government.  See  Holt
(1999).
ABSTRACTS
Political ideology has been a confusing topic for social analysts,  and those who attempted to
eschew  judgmental  reductions  of  others’  conceptions  and  develop  a  non-polemical  political
psychology found ideology behaving in ways that defeated their theories of political reasoning.  I
argue that political ideology can best be understood as actors’ theorization of their own position,
and available strategies, in a political field.   
A ideologia política tem sido um tema confuso para os investigadores sociais e para aqueles que
tentam evitar julgar as limitações de outras conceções e desenvolver uma psicologia política não
polémica  que  procure  encontrar  um comportamento  ideológico  que  ultrapasse  as  teorias  do
raciocínio  político.  Defendo  que  a  ideologia  política  pode  ser  melhor  entendida  como  uma
teorização da posição dos próprios atores e de estratégias disponíveis no campo político.  
Le thème de l'idéologie politique suscite la confusion chez les chercheurs sociaux et chez ceux
qui  s'efforcent  d'éviter  de  juger  les  limites  d'autres  conceptions  et  de  développer  une
psychologie politique non polémique, afin de trouver un comportement idéologique qui dépasse
leurs théories du raisonnement politique. Je soutiens que l'idéologie politique peut être mieux
comprise  en  tant  que  théorisation  de  la  position  des  acteurs  eux-mêmes  et  de  stratégies
disponibles, dans le champ politique  
La ideología política ha sido un tema confuso para los investigadores sociales y para aquellos que
intentan evitar juzgar las limitaciones de otras concepciones y desarrollar una psicología política
no polémica que busque encontrar un comportamiento ideológico que trascienda las teorías del
raciocinio  político.  Defiendo  que  la  ideología  política  puede  ser  mejor  entendida  como  una
teorización de la posición de los propios actores y de estrategias disponibles en el campo político.
  
INDEX
Mots-clés: idéologie, partis politiques, psychologie politique
Palavras-chave: ideologia, partidos políticos, psicologia política
Palabras claves: ideología, partidos políticos, psicología política
Keywords: ideology, political parties, political psychology
What is ideology?




Professor at University of Chicago, 1126 E 59th Street, Chicago IL 60637. E-mail: 
jlmartin@uchicago.edu
What is ideology?
Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas, 77 | 2015
23
